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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with Finnish food companies and their logistical strategies regarding 
doing business in Russia. However it is not intended solely for food companies per se, rather 
it is a compilation for companies interested in expanding into Russian markets of diverse best 
practices and applications describing ways to deal with arising trials and tribulations in terms 
of logistics after the 1998 crisis in Russia. 
 
Unique trading and business relations of Finnish companies, especially food companies in 
Russia can be traced to the times of Czar, when Finland was an autonomous region, but a part 
of the Russian Empire. It was always of great concern for Russia and subsequently for its 
business partners to develop reliable distribution networks and systems, which is why this 
writing presents an overview of developments of Finnish food companies in the context of 
Russian culture, as well as in the context of popular and approachable theories and 
frameworks of logistics. 
 
The essential question of the study was to understand if there is a correlation between the 
types of operations Finnish food companies and their logistics arrangements in Russia. The 
findings include a model proposition. This model states that due to the nature of the fast paced 
business environment in Russia it is viable for Finnish food companies to develop a 
combination of local presence in the form of own production and outsourcing techniques, 
while primarily focusing on the core activities of the firm. Other types of activities are 
however subject to more flexible logistical considerations. These outcomes were concluded 
based on secondary research and primary research based on interviews, questionnaires and 
personal discussions with knowledge holders of the industry. 
 
Additionally, various problems are discussed regarding logistic operations of Finnish food 
companies in Russia. The major concerns were reported to be traffic congestions in the 
metropolitan areas, such as St. Petersburg and Moscow. 
 
Keywords: Logistics, Finnish food, Russia, Internationalization, Outsourcing 
Total number of pages: 68 
 2 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................4 
1.1 Background .............................................................................................................4 
1.2 Research Problem....................................................................................................4 
1.3 Research Questions .................................................................................................4 
1.4 Limitations ..............................................................................................................5 
1.5 Structure..................................................................................................................5 
 
2 CONTEXT ...................................................................................................................6 
2.1 Food sector..............................................................................................................6 
2.1.1 Soviet & Pre-crisis..........................................................................................6 
2.1.2 Post-crisis.......................................................................................................8 
2.2 Logistics in Russia...................................................................................................9 
2.2.1 Soviet & Pre-Crisis.........................................................................................9 
2.2.2 Post-crisis.....................................................................................................10 
2.3 Finnish food companies in Russia..........................................................................11 
2.3.1 General.........................................................................................................11 
2.3.2 Customers ....................................................................................................16 
 
3 LITERATURE  REVIEW.........................................................................................17 
3.1 Theories ................................................................................................................17 
3.1.1 Stages of Internationalization........................................................................18 
3.1.2 Principal - agent ...........................................................................................21 
3.1.3 Supply Chain................................................................................................22 
3.1.4 Porter’s Competitive Strategies.....................................................................24 
3.1.5 Core capabilities...........................................................................................25 
3.1.6 Logistics Outsourcing...................................................................................29 
3.2 Foreign Operations ................................................................................................30 
3.3 Theoretical Framework..........................................................................................32 
 
4 INTERVIEW RESEARCH .......................................................................................38 
4.1 Methodology .........................................................................................................38 
4.2 Case Study Findings ..............................................................................................39 
4.2.1 Valio ............................................................................................................39 
4.2.2 Fazer ............................................................................................................42 
4.2.3 Paulig ...........................................................................................................45 
4.2.4 Atria .............................................................................................................48 
4.2.5 Others...........................................................................................................50 
4.3 Summary...............................................................................................................52 
5 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................54 
 
REFERENCES 
INTERVIEWS 
APPENDICES 
 3 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 2-1 Supply Chain in USSR ................................................................................... 7 
Figure 2-2 Share by country of Finnish food product exports 2006, 2007, and end-July 
2008 (Finnish Board of Customs 2008).................................................................................13 
Figure 2-3 Share of Russia and the USSR in Finnish foreign trade 1860–2005, % (adapted 
from: Ollus & Simola 2006) .................................................................................................15 
Figure 2-4 Real Disposable Income in Russia compared to Russian GDP, years 2004 - 
2007 (Bank of Russia & ATKearny 2005) ............................................................................16 
Figure 3-1 The Basic Mechanism of Internationalization - State and Change Aspects 
(adapted from: Johanson & Vahlne 1977).............................................................................19 
Figure 3-2 Agency Theory Overview (Eisenhardt 1989, 59) ...........................................21 
Figure 3-3 The Supply Chain Concept (adapted from: Arnold, Chapman, Clive 2007)....23 
Figure 3-4 The roots of Competitiveness (adapted from: Prahalad & Hamel 1990) .........27 
Figure 3-5 The hedgehog concept (adapted from: Collins 2001) .....................................28 
Figure 3-5 Logistics Outsourcing Matrix (Bolumole et al. 2007, adapted from: Earl 1996, 
Spear 1997) 29 
Figure 3-6 Framework model..........................................................................................34 
Figure 4-1 Development trend of Valio...........................................................................41 
Figure 4-2 Added value of Valio’s operations in Russia..................................................42 
Figure 4-3 Added value of Fazer’s operations in Russia..................................................45 
Figure 4-4 Added value of Paulig’s operations in Russia ................................................48 
Figure 4-5 Added value of Atria’s operations in Russia ..................................................50 
Figure 5-1 Framework model, revised.............................................................................54 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 2-1 Industrial composition of FDI in Russia 1995-2003 in % (Adapted from: 
Ledyaeva 2007) ....................................................................................................................12 
Table 2-2 Structure of Finland’s Merchandise Exports to Russia, 1992 – 2002 (Adapted 
from: Kotilainen 2004) .........................................................................................................13 
 
 4 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe logistic patterns of Finnish food producing companies 
in Russia after the 1998 economic crisis, as well as explain their reasons for choosing such 
distribution methods; and their approaches to tackling arising obstacles on the way of adding 
value to the overall chain. This study utilizes the empirical case research method, where the 
foundation of the findings is based upon a case study of a company.The primary information 
was gathered by the means of interviewing respective knowledge holders in a particular case 
company. 
1.2 Research Problem 
The research problem of this writing could be formulated as a simple question – “How does 
choosing a specific organizational structure of Finnish food companies in Russia affect their 
logistical considerations?” 
1.3 Research Questions 
To follow up on this question the following inquiries come to mind: 
1. What organizational structures are in use by Finnish food companies in Russia? Why? 
2. What logistical maneuvers do these companies undertake compared to their 
organizational structure? 
3. Is there a correlation of the two? If yes, what and how strong it is? 
4. What is the value added within these logistic structures? 
Overall this study will try to pin-point the main facts of the industry experience so that other 
Finnish players could build on the knowledge gathered and put it into practice with maximum 
benefit and minimum risk. All of the potential answers will be presented in the Conclusions 
section of this thesis. 
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1.4 Limitations 
The limitations of the study were few, but they represented a minor share of difficulty with 
the project thus causing only slight nuisance regarding its preparation. One critical limitation 
though was the primary research availability. Interviews needed to be prepared in advance 
with the corresponding knowledge holders; however the project was scheduled to be 
commissioned during the summer, the time when many of the people selected for interviews 
were absent from their workplaces. Thus not all of the interviews could be concluded in the 
first few months of the project. Yet, in the end only two companies did not follow up on the 
interview possibility, leaving seven major Finnish food producers involved in the Russian 
market to participate and provide quality feedback. Additionally some of the interviewees 
were not physically present in Finland or Russia, which would present a hassle should the 
author opted for a face-to-face interview. But this was resolved by substituting personalized 
interview with an emailed questionnaire. Of course the answers were not as full and 
elaborated; still they provided the necessary data required for the project. Another constraint 
that was obvious, as with other general research papers was the enormous information base, 
which made it more difficult to search and select applicable studies for this writing. 
1.5 Structure 
Initially, I describe the context of past and existing structures that guided Russian and Finnish 
logstics food systems. I introduce and compare Soviet & Pre-Crisis and Post-Crisis situations 
concerning the overall food sector, then I present a brief introduction of the Finnish food 
companies in Russia and describe their development history. Later this study presents 
collected theoretical frameworks, i.e. review of existing literature on the current topic, notably 
the Internationalization of the firm theory, Porter’s Competitive Strategies model, as well as I 
include multiple findings from the expansive work done by Reijo Luostarinen and other 
authors in the fields of Logistics, Outsourcing, and International Business. Additionally, 
preceded by methodology explanations a series of interview summaries and key findings is 
presented to test the theories in practice. Following are conclusions, which give an analysis of 
the combination of secondary and primary information gathered, as well as evaluate future 
research potential. 
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2 CONTEXT 
Years 1997-1998 have caused many countries to revise their views on many matters earlier 
deemed insignificant. In this case, the Russian Federation – a state, which gained its 
independence only several years before this major break down of its economical, political and 
ideological frameworks, was hit hard. Factors that influenced this turnout were numerous. 
However as the situation stabilized, with the help of a more liberal government, rising oil 
prices and a trend towards globalization Russian economy began picking up. 
Today Russia is the 10th largest economy in the world (Appendicies: #1), with a steady GDP 
growth, quickly adjusting to the realities of open market capitalism. Foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) are growing at a very optimistic pace even compared to other developing 
countries of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) abbreviation. Following this enormous 
expansion of opportunities and capital in all of its forms, the need for supporting services like 
logistics unsurprisingly sprung like mushrooms after rain. 
2.1 Food sector 
2.1.1 Soviet & Pre-crisis 
Compared to the Western foodstuff markets the Soviet system was largely different. Mainly 
two types of trade existed – government and cooperative (Радаев 2007, 42). Three 
characteristics were distinguishiable of the Soviet food production: massive volumes, 
centralized control, and lack of competition (Kaipio & Leppänen 2005, 36). The government 
organizations were viewed by the consumers mostly through Gastronoms - large shops where 
one could find a wide assortment of food products. Gastronoms were primarily presenet in the 
large and medium sized cities of the USSR. The supply chain that was behind these 
enterprises was that few massively large manufacturing plants would produce certain kinds of 
products for almost all of the countries Gastronoms’, and transported by a government 
transportation firm specializing in food distribution, which were subject to a particular food, 
like MolokoTrans (moloko = milk). Gastronoms were essentially over-the-counter shops that 
sold products by giving the consumer his product as opposed to the Do-It-Yourself model, 
where customers are freely allowed to select their products at their own pace. 
The cooperatives, which from a Western perspective were private enterprises owned by three 
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or more persons were also over-the-counter stores but a lot smaller in size and variety of 
products, mostly targeting the essentials or sometimes focusing on a specific product. The 
share of these two types of trade fluctuated from time to time, reaching a crucial difference in 
major cities in favor of cooperatives during the beginning of the 1990s (В.В. Радаев 2007, 
44). The supply chain of these stores was mostly built around personal connections of the 
owners of cooperatives, where that owner would negotiate a deal with and/or through close 
contacts engaged in either kolkhozes (see below) and/or in those government production 
plants. The actual transportation was usually done by the owners mostly due to the fact that a 
Soviet entrepreneur had to do everything himself as well as due to the lack of trust between 
the owner and the contractor with the merchendise; in that during volatile 1990s food was of 
much greater importance than money, thus giving an opportunity of criminal activity, i.e. 
stealing. 
 
Figure 2-1 Supply Chain in USSR 
Additionally there were several types of production/distribution systems in the USSR – 
kolkhoz and marketplaces or otherwise called open markets. Kolkhoz can be described as a 
“collective economy” or “collective farm”, which essentially was a farm, but had no direct 
owner (the government was the owner), which made it sometimes difficult for people working 
there to actually value their output. Kolkhoz appeared in the beginning of the Soviet era, 
when peasants and farmers were forced by collectivization to submit to a communal farm, 
which would then employ these farmers as government workers (Gregory & Stuart 1998, 79). 
This type of market activitiy provided for the local community, since in almost every even 
smallest city there was a collective farm. Of course in the case of larger and more developed 
kolkhozes, they also catered to a wider area, yet not so much as up to the country-wide 
coverage. Marketplaces were and are basic bazaars that primarily provided consumers with 
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basic-needs products, where people sold homegrown and/or kolkhoz provided produce. The 
government did not control these markets as tightly as the local mobs and gangs, which up to 
this day extract great profits from this system. 
In general the food product range in the Soviet Union was highly standardized for the public, 
except in the specialty stores like Berezka that provided imported goods as well as USSR 
made but of much better quality for the elite and persons who were entitled to the status of no-
hassle outside travel. Consumer goods as well as trade in general was given the least attention 
during the communist era, which proved to be crucially negative in the start of the 1990s and 
amounted to an enormous necessity product deficit. 
After the collapse, especially in the years of 1992-1993 Russian food market was practically 
paralyzed. The situation that occurred during that time was both horrible and trivial – Russia 
was on a verge of a food catastrophe. As opposed to China, which slowly, step-by-step 
opened up itself to foreign investments and market economy, Russia seemed like pressed 
some button and overnight the Soviet adage of ”lots of money – nowhere to spend” turned 
into ”lots of products – no money.” Although by the mid 1990s the situation on the food 
market began slowly improving, it did not show clear signs of growth until the big ”shake up” 
of 1998. 
2.1.2 Post-crisis 
Today the food sector in Russia is primarily characterized by the advancements coming from 
St. Petersburg, Leningrad region, Moscow, and Moscow region, thus when referring to the 
“Russian” food sector the above mentioned regions are the ones to play key roles in the food 
business. 
The economic crisis was a dramatic event in the lives of many people. Yet it was not obvious 
until several years later that not only it was supposed to happen anyway, but also that it 
brought various benefits to the transition of Russia onto the market economy tracks in 
general. For instance, with foreign product suddenly turning hugely expensive, most of the 
consumers turned to more cheaper, i.e. Russian made products, which was a green light to 
many Russian key players that were and are operating in the food industry today, like retail 
chains, distributors and manufacturers. 
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On some accounts, although marketplaces are still the dominant means of delivering products 
to consumers, retail chains in Russia are developing at a fast pace and are expected to take the 
lead over the marketplaces in the future (Kaipio & Leppänen 2005, 25). Other sources state 
that local over-the-counter stores seemed to be the most popular providers of food products 
for Russians (66%) according to a RLMS study done in 2006. Following were the 
marketplaces (46%) and retail chains (46%). Additionally it was mentioned that the older the 
consumer the more often he/she visits marketplaces rather than the newly established retail 
chains; which could be explained by the nature of a human being, where in general the older a 
human gets the harder it is for him/her to change buying and other habits (Радаев 2007, 101). 
2.2 Logistics in Russia 
2.2.1 Soviet & Pre-Crisis 
Throughout the years Soviet distribution systems were based on tightly controlled 
organizational hierarchy, where for the majority of cases, every institution knew which 
particular segment or industry they were responsible for. The schedules of almost any type of 
product in the Soviet Union were centrally planned and closely regulated, which according to 
market economy principles resulted in dreadful consequences like overproduction, 
inefficiency of labor as well as other factors. On the other hand this leverage provided for 
high degree of transparency, which in turn made a great deal of tasks, like supplying, storing, 
and delivering various products, much less complicated for all the members of the supply 
chain and everyone else who was interested, given of course the security clearances. Without 
a doubt there were miscalculations that simply put delivered redundant results. It is no secret 
that a great proportion of resources went into the military complex. Yet logistics as a science 
dates back to the Roman, Greek and other empire periods, when armed forces were not only 
important but essential to a nation’s existence. Soviet Union was a highly militarized and 
unpredictable country, thus the major investment swings into railway networks, air link 
developments etc. during several Five-Year Plans; whereas during others there were little or 
no inflows of resources into these fields of interest, which is why many regions in Russia 
were and today still are practically disconnected from the outside world.  
Nevertheless, production was done at a national level, meaning someone at the office in 
Moscow calculated to produce X amount of certain product in some region over the course of 
say a year. Once this decision has been embedded into the yearly planning process, the region 
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was supposed to produce the given number of X or more. Managing the flow of goods, 
information and resources in this situation was not particularly difficult because for the most 
part it was about following the plan, especially in the food business. There were no 
supermarkets and mega-mall chains like today – simply small scale shops with a warehouse 
design that would stock up on essential products from the nearest factories or Sovkhoz; or 
open markets where Kolkhoz representatives would drive up and sell the products from the 
back of their trucks. There were no demand fluctuations – everything would sell, due to great 
product shortages. 
In the mid eighties with Gorbachev and perestroika came some changes that would ignite the 
process of USSR dissolution. Several important laws were passed during that time, which 
stipulated permission of 1) private ownership as well as 2) transfer of state enterprises from 
strictly government subsidized conglomerates to companies that were more or less free to do 
as they wish (Gregory & Stuart 1998, 299). The latter posed various threats for large 
enterprises and the USSR economy as a whole, because many of them were actually on the 
verge of bankruptcy and were supposed to stay afloat based on their own performance rather 
than State help. 
Unfair privatization began. Due to lack of quality information and knowledge of market 
economy principles almost everyone in Russia was left over board. The people who designed 
the system were the ones to profit (Earle 1999, 38). For several years gigantic enterprises 
were unable to not only make a profit or at least break even, they could not function properly 
and hence pay salaries, support neighboring regions etc. Logistics has played a major role in 
this scenario. Soviet Union was strategically separated into various areas where certain 
products would be manufactured/harvested and then distributed all over the USSR. Once the 
Union stopped existing it was legally impossible to transport anything anywhere even at a 
basic level because there were no regulations in place. Commonwealth of Independent States 
was established shortly after the collapse, but the initial effects were devastating, which 
would improve only slightly before the next hit. 
2.2.2 Post-crisis 
With the collapse of USSR, many of the larger organizations quickly vanished into the free, 
but very cruel air of the market veracity. Some were privatized. Few actually became viable 
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businesses that built on the knowledge of previous years and could manage to combine that 
with the lessons learned about competition, price control, and extensive supply chain 
management techniques of the modern days. 
In August 1998, then prime-minister Sergei Kirienko delivered a message that would shock 
not only regular Russians, but most importantly the international investment community. 
Russian government has announced its inability to pay on its debt. This caused a colossal 
uproar around the world. Some say this Russian crisis was caused by the 1997 Asian crisis 
that resulted in the same astonishing effect, yet the causes of it are not to be described in this 
paper. 
The 1998 crisis seemed to have destroyed what was merely a hope for the Russian economy. 
Yet, by the beginning of the new millennium statistics started showing signs of actual 
progress within several industries at once. Due to increasing oil prices, better harvests and 
improved handling of the country, when Vladimir Putin took over as Prime Minister, Russia 
quickly reverted to the path of development and growth. Today, almost 10 years after the 
crisis major multinational corporations, as well as small and medium enterprises are making 
their way into the Russian market. Many companies set up their operations in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg and other large cities from scratch, however a noticeable share of firms are 
returning after the crisis blow. This demonstrates that Western world has gained more 
confidence in the Russian economy, policy and will to provide for globalization (recent events 
of the crisis between Georgia and Russia will of course influence this position, but only to 
some extent due to cancellation of sanctions from the EU and the U.S.). 
2.3 Finnish food companies in Russia 
2.3.1 General 
Finland’s share in Russian economy in general has been tremendous over the course of 
history. Throughout the Czarist and Empire times to the modern day Russian Federation, 
Finland continues to play the role of a friendly neighbouring country interested to work 
together and create partnerships with representatives from the East. A reasonable way to look 
at exactly how friendly Finland is in terms of business opportunities, a concept of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and overview of exporting can prove to be interesting. 
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Russia is a part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), meaning it accepts the definition 
and measurement system of FDI (see Foreign Direct Investment Statistics 2001 for more 
information). Total FDI infolws in 2007 into Russia doubled to almost USD 29 billion from 
2006 (UNCTAD 2007). According to Central Bank of Russia FDIs of newly created shares 
from Finland into the Russian non-financial sectors amounted to USD 173 million, or about 
0,6% of the total capital inflow (see Appendices # 6). On the other hand this is somewhat of a 
large figure, conisdering that the Inward Foreign Direct Investments in Nonbanking 
Corporations from Finland were USD 787 million. 
In order to find pertinance to this writing we must examine the food processing sector of the 
economy and its share of FDIs. Table 2-1 shows the break-down of the sectors before and 
after the crisis and their percentage shares of FDI received. It shows a decrease from 19% to 
13%, which was due to the consequences of the crisis. However today, the overall FDI into 
Russian food manufacturing (including tobacco production) accumulates almost USD 1,2 
billion (see Appendices #7), which equals to a little over 4%. Such a decrease in several years 
is most likely due to the echoing benefits of the crisis of 1998, where foreign food produce 
suddenly became greatly expensive, so consumers started switching to more cost-appealing 
products, which were predominantly Russian made.  
 
Table 2-1 Industrial composition of FDI in Russia 1995-2003 in % (Adapted from: 
Ledyaeva 2007) 
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Regarding exports, even though overall food exports have been diminishing in turnover since 
1994 (see Table 2-2) and does not constitute a very large proportion of the overall trade 
between Finland and Russia today – about three percent (Ollus & Simola 2006, 28) - Russia 
has been championing the title of Finland’s largest trader in terms of the foodstuff exports 
(see Figure 2-2) with nearly 300 hundred million euros in value (see Appendices #5). 
 
Table 2-2 Structure of Finland’s Merchandise Exports to Russia, 1992 – 2002 (Adapted 
from: Kotilainen 2004) 
 
Figure 2-2 Share by country of Finnish food product exports 2006, 2007, and end-July 
2008 (Finnish Board of Customs 2008) 
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Today’s situation regarding the food industry in Russia is in part due to strong foundation that 
was built on the collosal work undertaken various Finnish food companies. The history of 
many Finnish food companies engaging in business activity in Russia is known to have its 
beginnings in the Tsarist Russian Empire and as well as Soviet Union. Atria, for example has 
been established in 1903 as a cooperative and supplied various near-by regions; Valio began 
its operations in 1908 and Fazer started with confectionary produce in 1891, both at the time 
of rule under the Russian Empire. Notable evidence of strong relationships between the USSR 
and Finnish representatives can be remembered when in 1980 Moscow hosted the Olympics, 
yet food produce was at colossal shortage. Russian Olympic Committee in the shortest of 
times was able to organize enough food supply for over five million attendees not including 
the locals, all thanks to the prompt ability of Finnish suppliers to deal with this unexpected 
demand efficiently, partially because of the supply chain management methods utilized at the 
time (Forum MSK 2008). 
For the majority of the transactions Finland and USSR developed special barter transaction 
agreements that allowed Finland to have major energy supplies at a cheaper price than 
everyone else as well as push products of its companies into the Soviet market. Later this 
became known as the clearing barter, which significantly added to the Finnish economic 
boom in the early 1980s (Шпаак 2003). This can be seen through exports as well (Figure 2-
3). 
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Figure 2-3 Share of Russia and the USSR in Finnish foreign trade 1860–2005, % 
(adapted from: Ollus & Simola 2006) 
Over the past couple of decades cooperation between Russian and Finnish companies has had 
its ups and downs. Today, almost all of the major Finnish food corporations are established 
one way or another in the Russian market, due to the booming economy and great business 
opportunities. Many of these firms represent true Finnish traditions of cuisine by delivering 
quality products to its customers through various distribution techniques that require great 
deal of time and skill to be properly set up and managed. 
A great deal of food companies in Finland previously saw Russian market and its customers 
as an area of huge, yet still under-realized potential. Currently the situation is changing 
drastically – opportunities for Finnish food producers are enormous, e.g. Russian GDP and 
disposable incomes are growing at an average rate of 7% and 11% respectively (Figure 1), 
where the demand for groceries is booming, with an average Russian spends about 40% of 
his/her income on foodstuffs (Ekonomilehti 2006). 
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Figure 2-4 Real Disposable Income in Russia compared to Russian GDP, years 2004 - 
2007 (Bank of Russia & ATKearny 2005) 
2.3.2 Customers 
As many interviewees claim and as is obvious by looking at the world map – Russia is a large 
country. Meaning any deliveries into the less developed regions of Russia are subject to risk, 
cost and other factors negatively influencing the overall price of the delivery. For that matter, 
a great majority of the interviewees state that their primary business areas in Russia are 
essentially the richest regions – Moscow and St. Petersburg. Not even so much Moscow, 
because of its relatively far distance as compared to cultural capital of Russia. The primary 
clients of Finnish food companies in Russia for delivering products within these two 
favorable regions could be broken down into the following major segments: HoReCa and 
large supermarkets, hypermarkets etc. 
The size of Russian Hotel, Restaurant and Catering business segment was to be worth 
approximately USD 12 – 13 billion as was estimated by the Russian State Statistics 
Committee. Several interviewees indicated that this sector is an important part of their 
business activities in Russia, for example Paulig exclusively supplies Moscow McDonalds 
with its coffee (FlexNews 2008). Supermarkets and alike focusing on retail food trade, i.e. the 
market of fast moving consumer goods in Russia in 2006 generated 46% of all the retail trade 
or USD 146 billion (Радаев 2007, 11). 
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3 LITERATURE  REVIEW 
This section is concerned with describing main frameworks that specialize in determining 
expansion strategies of companies from multiple industries as well as the reasons for their use 
in a wide area of fields. At the same time I have tried to align these theories to be pertinent to 
the general topic of this study. 
3.1 Theories 
In order to properly grasp why Finnish food companies do business in Russia today as they 
do, we must pay attention firstly to the frameworks provided on a general level to any 
company that is interested in broadening its operations and participating in the globalization 
“slumber party.”  
Several definitions must be first described: 
• Home country – the country of headquarters location, i.e. Finland; 
• Target country – the country of exporting and manufacturing activities involved, i.e. 
Russia; 
• A company – a food production company. 
The following theories and concepts are inroduced in part based on the research questions 
outlined earlier, i.e. this section should introduce and describe the answers to research 
questions as well as provide an understandable overview. Firstly I present the Stages of 
Internationalization, which is supposed to lay the groundwork of the available foreign 
operations to any company. This conception brings us to the Principal-Agent model, which 
describes the relationship between the company in home country and its operation in target 
country. In other words, Stages of Internationalization is the introduction, whereas Principal-
Agent is a 100% zoom into any of the Stages. Supply chain concept explanation follows to 
familliarize the reader with the basics of Supply Chain architecture. An important part of this 
thesis is the focus on the concept of Core activities or processes as well as other theories that 
are touched by it directly or indirectly, mainly Logistics Outsourcing. 
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3.1.1 Stages of Internationalization 
At a certain critical point like recession in local & national markets, unattractive growth rate, 
low profit margins etc., companies understand that it is in their best interests to expand their 
operations across the border to profit from such advantages as low taxation, skilled labor 
force, dynamic market etc. This is certainly true for companies that reside in Finland, because 
favorable geographic position and close historical and cultural ties allow Finnish companies 
to perpetuate Russian business and develop long lasting trading relationships. However, due 
to differences in e.g. language, education, business practices, culture, and industrial 
development problems might arise. Johanson & Vahlne (1977, 24) define this pattern as the 
“concept of psychic distance”, or the sum of factors preventing the flow of information from 
and to the market. 
Additionally Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) as well as Johanson & Vahlne (1977) 
identify four major stages of internationalization, or as Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul refer to 
the sequence of stages – the establishment chain: 
1) No regular export activities, 
2) Export via independent representatives (agent/joint venture), 
3) Sales subsidiary, and 
4) Production/Manufacturing. 
In the first stage, a company mainly operates in its own “start up” environment. There is no 
need for a company at this stage to engage in full scale expansion projects; rather by fulfilling 
occasional orders from outside of its region it acquires highly important knowledge on the 
customs and traditions of such transactions. In the future when a company decides to expand 
into other markets this know-how will be useful in dealing with unexpected obstacles at least 
in an intuitive way. Because of Finland’s small, outlying home markets, companies are 
actually compelled to expand their markets abroad and seek growth potential there (Saralehto 
1989, 103). 
When a company accepts the challenge to finally move out of its comfort zone and conquer 
an attractive market, the easiest, i.e. with the least risk undertaking is by forming a joint 
venture (JV) with a company that has been established on the market of interest. Starting 
regular exporting operations brings more aggravation to the business, especially due to 
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increase in obligations before the company’s JV partner. Significant amount of time should be 
devoted to building solid trading relations. A JV assumes various forms of logistical 
operations, e.g. exporting finished products from home country to target country or exporting 
semi-finished goods from home target for final stages of manufacturing in the target country. 
Subsequently, once a company has outgrown a JV and is ready to incorporate an independent 
office in a foreign land, it has reached stage three – sales subsidiary. A subsidiary, besides 
sales, can be responsible for multiple functions, such as marketing, logistics, financials etc. 
However, as the authors state, this is a simplified model, where many inner correlations can 
take place, e.g. it is not always obvious whether a firm has established relations with an agent 
or not, while a joint venture with an earlier representative can be placed in the second or the 
third stage (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul 1975, 307). 
Following the representative office is the fourth stage of international expansion – production 
in the host country. By far subject to the most risk and cost way of delivering product to the 
final point of sale. The risks are multiple; the most important ones – not knowing enough 
about the business arena and culture of the country/region, as well as possible political and 
economical instability. 
 
Figure 3-1 The Basic Mechanism of Internationalization - State and Change Aspects 
(adapted from: Johanson & Vahlne 1977) 
Internationalization process is a process where an enterprise gradually increases its 
international involvement, which in part is an interplay between the development of 
knowledge about foreign markets and operations on one hand and an increasing commitment 
of resources to foreign markets on the other (Johanson & Vahlne 1990, 11). Thus the basic 
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assumption here is that market knowledge and market commitment affect both commitment 
decisions and the way current decisions are performed - and these, in turn, change market 
knowledge and commitment (Andersen 1993, 211). 
One of the loudest criticism remarks directed at this theory is the sequential, i.e. step-by-step 
following of the recommendations given. These stages are not necessarily to be gone through 
by order. Evidence exists that enterprises in fact do not need to retrace the steps of 
internationalization suggested above. In fact companies that are extremely successful in 
globalizing their operations quickly and most profitably or companies that are established 
from day one so that they are servicing various markets at once are referred to as the Born 
Globals (Mathews & Zander 2007, 390). Sometimes a fifth stage is included, called 
Development, which describes the total assimilation of a company in a foreign land by 
beginning to participate in supportive projects like infrastructure planning, i.e. this concept is 
similar to what the state enterprises in the Soviet Union used to do in the populated areas they 
worked. Also, a number of enterprises engage in multiple stages at the same time to minimize 
the risk as well as explore potential opportunities. Other critics regarding the Stages model are 
more of complaints rather than actual critisism. For example, Anderson (1993, 217) refered to 
it as “tautological.” Internationalization of the Firm has been developed based primarily on 
the empirical data collected from four individual industrial manufactureres in Sweden, thus 
excluding the services industry as well as neglecting the network effects (Bradley 1991). 
However, empirical studies proved that many firms around the world have followed the 
incremental process as described by the Stages or Upsala internationalization model, thus 
proving acceptance of the overal structure of the model, even though many of the studies 
regarding this matter were performed in Scandinavian countries (Cavusgil 1984, Sullivan and 
Bauerschmidt 1990). Additionally, it is mentioned that the Upsala model does not provide for 
predictions of the movements of the firms form one stage to the other, rather only possible to 
characterize the firms that have been classified into different stages (Anderson 1993, 224).  
Additionally to the mentioned descriptions there are numerous other studies that draw from 
the conclusions described, like Yadong Luo’s and Rosalie Tung’s International expansion of 
emerging market enterprises: a springboard perspective of 2007, where instead of the four 
stages above there are niche entrepreneurs, world-stage aspirants, transnational agents, and 
commissioned specialists. This study focuses on the Multinational Enterprises, as well as their 
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ownership (governmental, non-governmental, part/part). However the main idea behind this 
theory is closely related to the one depicted above. Also there are other studies that contribute 
to the thought discussed in this chapter (Wickramasekera & Oczkowski 2006, 39-56). 
Further I will present more analysis regarding the Upsala model in a different context, mostly 
drawing from conclusions of Reijo Luostarinen and his doctoral thesis on Foreign Operations. 
3.1.2 Principal - agent 
The principal agent theory (PAT) is concerned with the separation of ownership and control 
of economic activities between the agent and the principal (Halldorsson et al. 2007, 287). In 
the case of this study, an example could represent local enterprise in target country and 
headquarters in home country respectively. Unavoidably, when two parties of hierarchical 
dependacy are engaged in business activities, a relationship occurs. PAT, in the words of 
Eisenhardt (1989, 58) in part I exists to account for resolving two problems that might be 
present in that relationship. Firstly, a problem arises when the principal’s and agents’ goals 
conflict; and secondly, when it is expensive/difficult for the principal to verify if the agent is 
acting according to the agreed to guidelines. 
 
Figure 3-2 Agency Theory Overview (Eisenhardt 1989, 59) 
In order to mitigate the risks of failure to perform on the agent side as well as the risks of 
being remunerated accordingly from the principal’s perspective, a contract is undersigned to 
develop an agreement that is tangible, legal and verifiable. Which in part solidifies the 
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relationship between the interested parties. It however should be noted that the contract needs 
to be properly structured to accomplish that goal. Jensen & Meckling (1976, 317) for example 
state that “the most important conflict arises from the fact that as the manager’s ownership 
claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as searching out 
new profitable ventures falls.” Meaning, when the contract is outcome based the agent is more 
likely to act in the interest of the principal. Additionally, should a principal be capable of 
verifying the actions of the agent, the agent in part will be less likely to perform not in 
accordance with the principal’s interests (Eisenhardt 1989, 60). The “most efficient contract” 
includes the right mix of behavioral and outcome-based incentives (Halldorsson et al. 2007, 
287). 
Eisenhardt (1989, 71) proposes that PAT is most relevant in situations in which contracting 
problems are difficult. This brings us to a concrete example, regarding current thesis. Based 
on primary research it was evident that trust-worthy 3PLs are somewhat of a pain to find. 
According to Logan (2000, 21) the question is no longer whether outsourcing makes strategic 
or financial sense, but how to develop mutually beneficial relationships. Meaning that 
companies currently engaged and/or looking to expand their operations in Russia, as well as 
Russian 3PLs, should focus more on compromising and working together towards a common 
goal, established in a properly underwritten contract. 
Additionally, risk sharing is also of an importance to the PAT, due to the nature of contractual 
obligations and objectives. Key finding regarding risk in terms of agency theory is that 
behavioral management techniques, such as supplier certification and development, quality 
management programs etc., which try to limit the difference in received information by 
multiple parties will actually align organizational objectives and program supplier activities 
for the enterprises that are considered to be purchasing (Zsidisin & Ellram 2003, 25). 
3.1.3 Supply Chain 
The supply-chain — a term now commonly used internationally — encompasses every effort 
involved in producing and delivering a final product or service, from the supplier's supplier to 
the customer's customer (Supply Chain Council, 2008). Due to fierce competitiveness of 
business environments, the concept of Supply Chain, amongst others, has emerged as a 
powerful tool for boosting efficiency and profitability by e.g. reducing inventory levels, 
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improving customer service and flexibility of the firm and others (Farmer & Ploos van Amstel 
1991, 1-2). 
However, the crucial point is not for a company to simply have a supply chain that does its 
job; the idea is to integrate the supply chain into the overall value chain of the company so 
that it becomes more agile in terms of responding to market pressures . Hutchinson (1987) 
mentions that already in the 1950s there was a “drive toward integrated approach” 
predominantly caused by the technological breakthroughs as well as volatile economic market 
conditions. Yet, after almost half a century great deal of companies are far away from 
delivering value to their customers at the fullest rate (Spekman et al. 1998). To follow up a 
Supply Chain needs to stress the importance of building relationships and business process 
that deliver value to customers by ensuring the value is created at each stage of the supply 
chain (Lambert et al. 1998). 
 
Figure 3-3 The Supply Chain Concept (adapted from: Arnold, Chapman, Clive 2007) 
The figure above presents an explanation of a theoretical Supply Chain model. Of course in 
real life the majority of enterprises follow a more complex and distributed framework, for 
example where a Manufacturer is also responsible for the Distribution System and provides a 
combination of the two. However, drawing from conclusions of the interviews it can be stated 
that Russian retail chains are acting as one of the main drivers of logistics development by 
cutting through the myriad partnerships in order to gain access to the initial provider of goods, 
 24 
 
thus lowering costs and increasing service levels. This in part is facilitated by the initial 
provider by outsourcing all activities not related to core competencies of the firm, which will 
be discussed shortly below. 
In the figure above, the arrows represent the value that an entity adds to the Supply Chain. 
Initially a Supplier is in charge of the actual supply of the materials. A Manufacturer then 
plans, controls and produces the end-product or good for a customer. The Distribution System 
is the entity that generates great concerns due to its obscurity, i.e. usually it is not simply one 
enterprise, but a combination of many companies working from different perspectives and 
levels, often creating conflict of interests between the involved parties. The Distribution 
System can comprise of various structures, like a company can be responsile for all of the 
Supply, Manufacture and Distribution procedures, making the company the owner of the 
Distribution System. On the other hand, the Supply Chain can be broken down into even more 
parts than mentioned on Figure 3-1, where a company might see multiple opportunities in 
having large phases of outsourced distribution. Various structures are available within the 
Supply Chain concept. It all comes down to the company deciding whether investing in 
ownership in logistics services is going to bring more value than an third party provider. 
Finally, the Customer through Physical Distribution receives the product he/she wanted. 
3.1.4 Porter’s Competitive Strategies 
In order to properly grasp the subsequent sections, it is necessary to understand where such 
notions were introduced. Over the years the term Competitive Strategy has become 
synonymous with practically any advantageous situation for an entity that is competing in a 
highly aggressive environment. Michael Porter (1980) was the one who introduced this term 
and classified its different aspects. There are several strategies commonly accepted by the 
business world in for achieving and maintaining competitive advantage, which is a relative 
advantage of a firm against its competitors in a particular field of business. Below are the 
brief descriptions of those strategies: 
1) Cost leadership. If the main advantage of an enterprise in the whole industry is to sell 
products cheaper than everyone else, which is mostly attributed to the concept of 
economies of scale, then this company is known to be a cost-leader, like e.g. Kopeika 
retailer stores in Moscow; 
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2) Differentiation. Should a company be a leader in an industry based on its unique 
combination of great industry sense and other highly valued services/products by its 
customers, the company is a differentiator, for instance Fazer Group with its bakeries, 
restaurants, and chocolate business; 
3) Focus or market segmentation. When a firm is primarily concerned with one or very 
few certain products/services, while paying less attention to other functions, it is 
known to be a focus company, like Paulig, a company that mainly specializes in 
producing its main product – coffee. 
The last point is crucial in proceeding. As I have gathered from interviewees there exist 
various tendencies as to how to streamline a firms processes as well as what processes should 
be touched upon first. Most of the interviewers agreed that focusing on their core 
competencies at the same establishing more relationships with the supply chain networks is a 
successful mix of duties and responsibilities to approach the problem of doing business in 
Russia. 
3.1.5 Core capabilities 
Core capabilities are those that differentiate a company strategically (Leonard-Barton 1992). 
A clear definition of core capabilities has been provided by Teece et al. (1990, 28), where 
core capabilities are a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets, and routines that 
provide the basis for a firm's competitive capacities and sustainable advantage in a particular 
business. 
Prahalad & Hamel (1990) have introduced this term, though referring to it as core 
competencies, by focusing on a comparison based on empirical data of various businesses, 
primarily from American and Japan. The study was concerned with determining why firms 
equal in their strategic composition had drastic divergence patterns – some strategically 
failed, other strategically won. For example, during the 1980s and technological boom in 
computing and communications, NEC, a communications, switching and transmission 
systems firm at the time, envisioned that computing, communications and their subsequent 
components would be an area of great potential in the years to come. To perpetuate this vision 
NEC undertook many strategic initiatives including over 100 alliances in only seven years, to 
gain cheap and easy access to the competencies of the markets NEC thought would flourish. 
GTE, a much larger competitor of NEC by all parameters at the time, on the other hand did 
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not hold such a strategic intent in mind, causing NEC to overtake GTE in terms of annual 
sales by more than 25%, even though 7 years before NEC’s sales were only 38% of that of 
GTE. However it should be noted that cultivating core competencies does not mean 
outspending rivals on Research and Development (R&D) or getting business to become more 
vertically integrated. Yet, there are three factors that need to be fulfilled in order to identify 
core competencies – firstly, a core competency provides access to various markets 
economically; second, it should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer 
benefit within the end product; and lastly, a core competence should be difficult to imitate 
(Prahalad & Hamel 1990, 83-84). 
By economics of markets it is understood that a company should not necessarily simply 
produce one product or deliver one service – certain degree of diversification is acceptable. 
However, firms that are diversified across a set of 'related markets' where the strategic assets 
are either few, or the processes required to improve and create them are context-specific, 
cannot be expected to out-perform unrelated diversifiers (Markides & Williamson 1994, 150). 
In other words, to increase its competitive advantage, a firm needs to identify its core 
activities, subsequently filter these capabilities into context of the market environment, and 
then deliver its end product/service to the customer (see Figure 3-4). 
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Figure 3-4 The roots of Competitiveness (adapted from: Prahalad & Hamel 1990) 
Somewhat shifting away from the strict academic approach to the problem, a highly practical 
concept was introduced by Jim Collins (2001) – the hedgehog concept (see Figure 3-5). 
Collins (2001) draws a comparison between a fox, a cunning creature, and a hedgehog, a 
genetic mix-up between a porcupine and a small armadillo and then transcending their 
differences onto the real business-world. Foxes can devise myriad schemes to reach their 
goals, but when they aim at catching the hedgehog – it fails. Because hedgehogs always focus 
on a single idea:  if attacked, roll up into a ball with their spikes protecting them.  Since they 
have only one simple strategy, they are free to perfect it, whereas “foxes pursue many ends at 
the same time and see the world in all its complexity”. Similarly, many enterprises, when 
trying to deal with multiple business tasks, maintaining minimal resource commitment and 
lowest risk aversion rates – get caught up in the complexity. By stripping non-core activities 
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from its business, a firm will save a great deal of resources like time and money, as well as 
have more opportunities to invest in the actual core activities, in order to boost their market 
focus and subsequently competitive advantage. 
 
 
Figure 3-5 The hedgehog concept (adapted from: Collins 2001) 
However, simply focusing on one particular activity is just not enough in the long run. A 
company needs to base its decisions not only on the type of activity, but also on the economic 
and human resources available; hence the questions in the figure above. The Economic engine 
is similar to the “various markets” concept, where the competencies should have enough room 
to be applied to in terms of financial reward; otherwise the company might seize to exist very 
quickly. The other aspect is the human resource available to the company. Collins (2001) goes 
in-depth regarding this issue, but on a general level, it can be explained as the following. 
Companies’ success rates depend on how productive the people working for them are, which 
in part comes down to how motivated those workers are. Should they be highly interested in 
their jobs – the company will perform like a steamroller, given it is provided with the correct 
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or proper course of action. Thus, as depicted above, a firm needs to position itself between the 
three circles to achieve the hedgehog’s agility. 
3.1.6 Logistics Outsourcing 
Outsourcing is the practice of charging external service providers with the task of performing 
in-house activities (Bolumole et al. 2007, 35). The overall objectives of outsourcing logistics 
of a company can  be multiple, e.g. cut costs, increase efficiency, focus on core activities, etc., 
yet the main goal is to deliver value from outside sources that is either too costly or simply 
unavailable for delivery within the actual firm per se (Barney 1991). 
Figure 3-5 Logistics Outsourcing Matrix (Bolumole et al. 2007, adapted from: Earl 1996, 
Spear 1997) 
In the figure above, Earl and Spear identify the various conditions, which are commonly 
referred to as outsourcing from the perspective of a focal firm. The authors of the figure look 
at these conditions through a prism of availability of resources and core competencies, as well 
as perceived value of the logistics within a firm. 
Firstly, in-house operations are closely related to the Porter’s Focus concept, where a 
company engages itself in processes that are thought to be its core activities, thus have no 
reason to be given away to a third party for development. A Spin-off, however, is a situation, 
when there is high resource availability in-house, yet the thought-of value is low, i.e. the firm 
determines that logistics is not a critical success factor overall even though there is potential 
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on its own. Quadrant #3 is primarily interested with situations when logistics is of low 
perceived value to the company and there are little resources available for its development. 
This is the case of logistics being a so-called commodity service, where there are minimal 
value-added processes involved and those that are - generally are essentially influenced by 
cost. Should an enterprise find logistics critical to its success on the market, yet lack the 
necessary capital, another approach could be regarded as an opportunity – Smart Sourcing. 
Smart Sourcing is a combination of company’s interest in developing an area of business and 
its ability to direct a third party logistics service provider (3PL) to do it. 
From the point of view of actual 3PLs, the critical factors that influence the outcome of a 
relationship between them and a focal firm in actual fact contribute more to the soft 
characteristics, e.g. communication, reputation, rather than to the hard characteristics, e.g. 
firm size (Knemeyer & Murphy 2005). 
3.2 Foreign Operations 
According to Reijo Luostarinen (Foreign operations, 1982) there are several types of foreign 
operations available for companies that wish to do business abroad, these are: 
indirect/direct/own export, licensing, contract manufacturing, co-production, own assembling 
and own manufacturing. Each of the operations has its advantages and disadvantages over 
others. Furthermore, these procedures need the following limitations: 
• There is a flow of goods (finished, semi-finished, parts, raw materials) from home 
to target country; 
• There is a flow of physical capital (equipment, tools) from home to target country; 
• There is a flow of human capital (know-how, personnel) from home to target 
country; 
• There is a flow of financial capital (equity, loans) from home to target country, but 
capital in the form of fees, royalties, and profits run in most cases in reverse flows, 
i.e. from target to home country. 
Marketing operations abroad or exporting can represent multiple forms. Indirect export is 
when a manufacturing company uses a home country middleman, i.e. export agent or 
association, government agency, as the first link in the distribution chain. On the other hand, 
direct export takes place when a company engages a target country middleman, i.e. import 
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firm or agent. Own exporting is described as selling company’s products through own sales, 
i.e. subsidiary company or branch. 
It should be noted that this classification of exporting is somewhat of a breakdown of the first 
three stages theory of Internationalization of the Firm, in that ‘no regular exporting activities’ 
might also assume test exports, where the home country exporting agent delivers the 
company’s products to a target country to “test the waters”; export via agent could be 
presented as the direct and indirect exporting activities; whereas during the third stage a 
company decides to establish own subsidiary office by the means of own export 
arrangements. 
Manufacturing operations are those operations that do not include flow of completely finished 
goods from home to target country, i.e. licensing, contract manufacturing, co-production, own 
assembling and own manufacturing. 
Licensing occurs when a home company sells a license or a right to manufacture and sell its 
products in the target country under the licensee’s name. Contract manufacturing is to some 
extent similar to licensing, but differs in two aspects: 1) under contract manufacturing are sold 
by means of arrangements of the home country, where in licensing the actually manufacturer 
sells the products; 2) financial capital flows are reversed, i.e. in licensing the home company 
receives fees for the sale of license, yet in contract manufacturing the home company actually 
pays the target company for the productions of goods. 
Co-production represents a type of manufacturing, where the target company typically 
provides the raw materials, labor and manufacturing facilities and the home company delivers 
advanced technology, equipment and management to lead the production processes. Own 
assembly is determined by the shipment of parts, components and semi-finished products 
from home to target company for assembling. 
Own manufacturing is represented when the home company has established production 
facilities in the target country. In the case of own manufacturing, the flow of goods can be 
multiple. For instance, a home company can manufacture goods in the target country as well 
as its initial manufacturing plant and engage in the cross-shipment of these products due to 
potential quality, cost and other concerns. 
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This situation is especially significant, because a great deal of Finnish food companies take on 
the Russian market through a third link – Estonia. Various companies have their presence in 
manufacturing and/or different types of marketing operations in Estonia because of the 
beneficial political, economical and social conjunctures for the Finnish companies. 
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
A framework is a particular set of rules, ideas or beliefs, which you use in order to deal with 
problems or decided what to do (English Dictionary 2001, 625). In our case there are several 
sets of questions needed to be answered, thus posing as the problem or problems. The 
framework outlined in Figure 3-6 will be used to describe and answer those questions on a 
general level for easier access and understanding. Since this study is a combination of 
explorative and descriptive purposes the framework will be pertinent in the corresponding 
areas of research. This model was put together by examining and utilizing the theories 
gathered from Literature Review as well as by assuming several features. 
Based on the descriptions mentioned in the interviews by the company representatives I have 
modified Luostarinen’s as well as Vahlne’s work insignificantly; simply for the purpose of 
better grasp. In other words when explaining the Type of Operations, instead of quoting 
direct/indirect and own export as simply export, representative and subsidiary. Thus export is 
when a company delivers its products to a foreign country without having any local presense 
in that country. A representative is a sales office, on a general level responsible for sales of 
the products, some marketing and custom’s clearance procedures. A subsidiary is a daughter 
company that is fully functional in terms of major administrative decisions, yet is attached to 
a certain type of local operations, i.e. manufacturing or exporting. Meaning that a daughter 
company of a Finnish food company in Russia is very likely to either be engaged in following 
and controling the manufacturing processes in a production plant in Russia or completely 
manage the flow of incoming goods from Finland and then supervising the distribution 
activities. The arrow pointing upwards on the left is a depiction of gradual build up of market 
knowledge and experience. Also by thinner and thicker borders of the boxes in the Types of 
Operations section, I tried to convey the message of less and more market commitment 
respectively (Vahlne & Johanson 1977, 27). 
The Type of Logistics has also been structured based on groundwork of Logistics 
 33 
Outsourcing and Supply Chain theories. The logistical procedures available are: Smart 
Sourcing, where a company does see necessary value in logistical expedition, yet does not 
have the potential and/or lacks capital to undertake this kind of venture on its own. I have 
added maybe somewhat of a confusing term – 100% outsourced, but this was done only in the 
best interest of the reader, due to the fact that during interviews with the respective knowledge 
holders, there was no specific classifitcation of terms. Meaning Outsourcing encompassed 
Smart Sourcing, actual Outsourcing and sometimes a Spin-off, leaving it up to the author to 
decide which one is which. Thus to avoid confusion I will prefix Outsourcing with a 100% to 
denote Smart Sourcing when speaking about interviewees comments;  
The actual Outsourcing is when a company does not have great capabilities within the 
logistical matters and does not deem it very valuable to the overal structure of the chain. This 
on the other hand is the broadest of all the logistical concept presented in this segment. 
Outsourcing is going to be denoted simultaneously as Part own/Part distributor, because 
companies that talked about their logistics which is done through distributors and other agents 
as well as through an in-house/spin-off organization within the firm, were utilizing the 
concept of Outsourcing; 
Finally In-house logistics or 100% owned logistics is when a company completely engages in 
logistical procedures for reasons, like pin-pointing that logistics is a core activity, that there 
are no reliable partners, hence all matters should be taken into own hands or for other various 
reasons. 
The interaction between the Type of Operation and Type of Logistics is integral and is 
explained the arrows in the middle. In this case Type of Operation is taken a more stable 
variable, i.e. Types of Operations will be developed based on the Types of Operation and not 
the opposite way. As market commitment increases, experience and knowledge flows are 
directly or indirectly, i.e. knowgly or without a specific goal respectively, take place in both 
directions. All of the participants of this chain, the home company, the target company, and 
the logistics service provider, benefit from such an exchange, because they gain valuable 
experience in working with a foreign enterprise, thus allowing for a balanced knowledge 
sharing platform. 
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Figure 3-6 Framework model 
A supply chain is every effort involved in producing and delivering a final product or service, 
from the supplier's supplier to the customer's customer, as seen from the previous description 
in the Supply Chain section. The greater the effort the more more responsive the overall 
supply chain is to the consumers buying swings and habits. The end transaction of the supply 
chain, delivery, or point of sale is regarded as any place where a structured sale could take 
place, i.e. documented sale. The most organized point of sales in Russia today are represented 
by the retail chains that are increasing their presence on the Russian market and are key 
clients of the majority of Finnish food companies. 
The supply chain methods utilized by Finnish food companies are integral to the efficiency of 
these flows, especially in Russia, a country of great risks and uncertainty. There is nothing 
new in that more control of a parent company of its operations abroad equals greater benefits 
under optimal conditions as well as more associated risks. However it is my view that Russian 
market is different due to its history and developing nature of the trade - in that some 
functions of a company should be either outsourced completely or to the point where it would 
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not greatly affect the bottom line should one or several risks be realized; i.e. the distribution, 
storage and transportation of goods should be contracted out to expert service providers that 
will deliver quality and reasonably priced services. Thus building feasible logistical 
procedures are necessary to properly address the needs of the market. 
Before proceeding several definitions must be made. A distributor is a Finnish and/or Russian 
agent that purchases goods from Finnish food companies for sale to another wholesaler and/or 
a retailer in Russia. Own distribution of a company in this case is a supply chain that is in 
direct ownership of that company, i.e. distribution is not a separate entity, but a part of the 
organization responsible for transportation, storage and delivery of products to a wholesaler 
and/or a retailer in Russia. By Smart sourcing and Outsourcing it is understood that a Finnish 
food company is engaged in various processes in Russia and third party service providers 
handle all of its logistics needs. 
Additionally a brake down or explanation of transcended types of operation abroad based on 
the studies above regarding Finnish food companies in Russia, their SWOT analysis as well 
as available and common distribution arrangements are presented in the following: 
 
 Own production Subsidiary Sales office Export 
Function Production facility/ 
facilities in Russia 
Daughter company  
in Russia responsible 
for marketing, sales, 
and production or 
import/export 
Representative 
office in Russia 
responsible for 
sales, import 
/export 
Exporting 
activities into 
Russia 
Logistics • 100% 
Outsourcing, 
• 100% Own, 
• Partially 
outsource and 
own 
• 100% 
Outsourcing, 
• 100% Own, 
• Partially 
outsource and 
own,  
• Part through 
distributors/part 
own, 
• 100% 
Distributor, 
• Part through 
distributors / 
part own 
• 100% 
Distributor 
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• 100% distributor 
Strengths • Short supply & 
value chain 
• Greater control 
over main 
functions of the 
business 
• Small amount 
of investment 
and risk, 
• Good ‘feel’ of 
the market 
• Least 
investment 
and risk 
Weaknesses • Great 
investments & 
risks 
• Great 
investments & 
risks 
• End product 
very 
dependent on 
corporate’s 
decision 
• Low levels 
of control 
over 
distributors’ 
actions and 
their 
consequence
s 
Opportunities • Lean 
manufacturing, 
• Efficient 
relationships 
with logistic 
partners 
• Establish Own 
Production 
• Develop 
relationships 
with 
employees on 
the spot 
• Establish 
Subsidiary / 
Own 
production 
• Develop 
relationships 
with 
distributors 
to gain more 
control 
• Establish 
Sales 
Office/Subsi
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The arrowed lines leading from Own production to Subsidiary and from Export to Subsidiary 
represent the area of involvement of two extremes – manufacture inside or outside. Should a 
company decide to engage in Exporting it will have the Sales Office and Subsidiary 
operations available to it for set-up. However should a company decide to manufacture - a 
production facility, a daughter company or both will be required. 
The initial three research questions have been introduced with partial answers. However it is 
crucial to investigate the empirical side of the study before drawing conclusions, purely on 
theoretical basis. 
It is also important to note that when a company begins to even investigate the possibility of 
concluding business in Russia exchange of information, knowledge, trust and capital takes 
place between the company and their Finnish or Russian partners regarding the respective 
business area. For example during the initiation stage a company can search for potential 
associates in Russia through existing personal networks of the firm. This in part generates the 
flow of information. Once a suitable Russian partner has been noticed, an exchange of 
knowledge on a particular topic occurs, which to some extent generates trust and 
companionship. To achieve these benefits a chain of reciprocal capital swaps need to take 
place, consequently opening prospects for future cooperation. 
Thus the model framework that would need to be explored and possibly modified based on 
the outcomes of interviews and secondary research (see Figure 3-6). 
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4 INTERVIEW RESEARCH 
In order to answer the concerns outlined in the Research Questions with the least amount of 
doubt I analyzed several interview transcripts from prior studies as well gathered own 
interview information from the largest Finnish food companies in terms of turnover 
(Talouselämä 2007). 
4.1 Methodology 
The methods and techniques utilized were limited to qualitative and empirical research due to 
the nature of the study. A questionnaire has been developed to gather enough information 
concerning Finnish food companies and their logistical arrangements. This questionnaire was 
designed for in-person dialogue; however representatives of several companies were not able 
to answer the prepared questions by this method due to the lack of time and/or presence 
within the boundaries of Finland. In these circumstances the questionnaire was sent out by 
email. Of course it needed to be tailored with more specific and direct questions resulting in a 
somewhat of a messy view of the survey. This and potentially the willingness to simply give a 
runaround exacerbated the matters and led to very brief and to some extent vague replies. 
Additionally one of the approached company’s representative stated that she does not possess 
the asked for information, whereas another firm promised several times to get back to the 
topic but up until now did not follow up on the request for the interview even though multiple 
exchanges regarding proposed topic took place. 
Overall eight companies have been interviewed. The major ones, i.e. Valio, Fazer, Paulig, and 
Atria delivered their input by the means of face-to-face interviews and provided the basis for 
the empirical research. The responses from these companies present a variation in many forms 
of the distribution systems described in the context of the framework and deserve a special 
case-by-case look into their experience and practices to view the topic more in-depth. 
Other companies were both smaller in size and environment of operations in Russia or 
provided smaller portions of information on the subject of their logistics in Russian market. 
Multiple studies concerning the similar subject already collected most of the newly gathered 
 39 
information (see Kaipio & Leppänen 2005 and Haimi 2007). However many of the critical 
areas were updated as well as important aspects generated specifically for the focus of this 
study. The subsequent Findings chapter discusses the main points collected from the 
interviews. 
The Findings include description of discussions with the major companies, which are subject 
to three parts – History, Key Findings, and Added Value. The history section briefly 
introduces the company and its main operational goals. Key Findings present the main aspects 
gathered about the company from the interview and subsequent discussions. The Added 
Value part is where the author tries to identify the value a company has generated over from 
operations in Russia in the context of various logistical bases. Also descriptions of other 
companies involved in the research is discussed in the Others segment. 
Additionally, during the presentation of the findings, I included several quotes directly from 
the interviews to emphasize the points made or to simply present the information from the 
angle of a company representative. For information of respective knowledge holders’ from 
the companies that participated in the interview see the Interviews section. 
4.2 Case Study Findings 
4.2.1 Valio 
History 
Valio Ltd has operated as an exporter in international markets for almost one hundred years. 
The company was founded in 1905 to organize butter exports to the UK. Valio strategy has 
been to establish itself abroad primarily through its own subsidiaries. This includes e.g. a 
presence in Belgium since the 1930's, operations in the US from 1955, and subsidiaries in 
Sweden, Estonia and Russia since the early 1990's. 
Finland became a member of the EU at the beginning of 1995. This meant a completely new 
kind of operating environment for the dairy industry like all others, as products were able to 
move freely throughout the EU without border protection, import charges or export subsidies. 
Valio had emphasized its customer orientation since the mid-1990's. The company has 
targeted closer cooperation and partnership with retailers and suppliers, in addition to meeting 
customer needs. 
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Sales responsibility has been increasingly handed over to subsidiaries. The goal is local 
presence in the principal market areas. Valio now has subsidiaries operating in all of its key 
export markets: Russia, Sweden, the Baltic States, Belgium and the United States. 
The most important Valio International product groups are cheeses, butter, powdered 
ingredients and fresh products. Key international markets include nearby countries Russia, the 
Baltic States and Sweden, along with other EU countries and the United States. Valio 
International also has a significant presence in specifically targeted areas such as China and 
Middle East. 
Key Findings 
Valio is a very respected company with high-quality products present on the Russian market, 
such as Viloa spreads and others. 
“…After war, we started trading business in the mid 50s. You know that at that 
time it was barter trade between Finnish government and Soviet Union and dairy 
products were included in those products. And then the third period started after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union when the new Russia was established. We started 
our operation in 1994 with the sales and marketing activities. Since then we have 
been present and improving and growing al the time, despite this typical times 
inflate 90s, with the collapse of the economy and strong devaluation of the Russia 
rouble. But briefly said now we can say that we are one of the leading dairy 
products in Russia. This year our sales will be 200 million Euros…so our main 
focus is production of dairy products like cheese, butter and nowdays fresh dairy 
products.” 
Valio is engaged in primarily exporting activities in Russia. Most of the products are made in 
Finland and other countries, like Estonia and then shipped to Russia through Valio’s St. 
Petersburg sales office, which is responsible for the sales/marketing functions and/or through 
Moscow’s distribution center, which is soon to become operational. There are sales 
representatives in other regions of Russia as well. Also Valio is: 
“…Finalizing a distribution centre in Moscow with investment of over 45 million 
euros.” 
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The distribution center was initially planned to gain a more competitive position in Russia, 
where big retail chains are building up their influence. However there is potential for 
production capabilities within Russia in the near future. Currently an increasing amount of 
products that are manufactured in Finland are transported directly to the big retailers opposing 
distributors, which should completely dominate the logistics system of Valio in long-term 
plans, even though the distribution and warehousing services currently are completely 
outsourced to 5 – 6 long term service providers. 
“We have very limited own asset in distribution, because we are working 
through distributors and warehousing and using their physical distribution from 
the warehouse to the point of consumption.” 
 
Figure 4-1 Development trend of Valio 
Shortly after the Soviet Union broke up and Valio began its operations in  new Russia, local 
partners, 3PLs were chosen to battle the problem of the time – open markets, where 
accountability and integrity was an issue. 
“…In the beginning of the 1990s the chain was very undeveloped in 
Russia…Most of the products were sold on the open markets. And that was a 
real challenge how to sell on the open markets and our strategy was that we 
choose few distributors and also that they took care of the distribution and sales 
with this open market system and you know that there are many levels in 
between the distributors and the final point of sale could be some babushka 
selling on the corner on the street. It has been very complicated. But since of the 
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90s it is a very fast evolution towards the normal system how it’s working 
everywhere else.” 
From Valio’s perspective there are several problems that are presently making it difficult to 
operate at a desired level. One of them is the traffic within Valio’s key target markets – St. 
Petersburg and Moscow. The traffic conditions are very much congested, which leads to 
inefficiencies regarding Valio’s overall business model in Russia. Also there is a need for 
more and tighter control over the distribution systems in place, due to the hard facts of the 
general economic principles, like constant price negotiations. On a broader scale, it is Valio’s 
view that Russian logistics, like the retail market is developing fast and well. 
 
Value 
 
Figure 4-2 Added value of Valio’s operations in Russia 
The primary value services are concentrated in the distribution and warehousing services of 
3PLs. Additional value-added services come from the sales office established in St. 
Petersburg and the newly established warehouse in Moscow. 
4.2.2 Fazer 
History 
Fazer Group originates from a family business founded in 1891. Today the Group offers 
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meals and bakery products and operates in a total of eight countries. The mission of Fazer 
Group is to offer taste sensations. Its operations are based on passion for customer, quality 
excellence and team spirit. 
The Group operates in three divisions, which are all committed to offering taste sensations: 
Fazer Amica, Fazer Bakeries and Fazer Russia. Fazer Amica is a leading contract catering 
company in the Nordic and the Baltic countries, offering customers delicious food and tailor-
made service solutions. The company operates in the Nordic countries, Estonia, Latvia and 
Russia. Fazer Bakeries offers fresh and tasty bakery products and operates in Finland, 
Sweden, Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Fazer Russia is responsible for Fazer’s bakery 
operations in Russia and is one of the leading bakery companies in Russia. Fazer’s most 
important associated company is Cloetta Fazer AB, which is the leading confectionery 
company in the Nordic countries. 
Key Findings 
Fazer’s entrance into the Russian market can look improperly timed at first, with the 
acquisition of Hlebniy Dom in St. Petersburg in 1997. However for Fazer this proved to be a 
major competitive advantage and a potential development platform for the future, due to the 
nature of the crisis, when domestically produced goods in Russia were cheaper. As well, just 
last spring Hlebniy Dom finished acquisition procedures of Svosnii bakery in Moscow 
establishing a solid, but for now underdeveloped presence on the Moscow market. Logistics 
play an important role for Fazer: 
“Logistics is one of key elements, factors, especially in bread. Because bread is 
fresh product. And it has to be distributed at least once a day, but in many cases 
we have distribution twice a day. Customers want their products fresh. So 
logistically it is a key element, how competitive the company is.” 
Logistically, Hlebniy Dom was organized through a distribution system of its own called 
HlebTrans. Yet, even with multiple negotiations, due to constant underperformance, Fazer 
decided to disregard HlebTrans and start off with a clean slate, by taking control of half of the 
distribution system in direct ownership of Hlebiy Dom, while outsourcing the other half to 
reliable partners and distributors. Parallel setting a standard in the Russian bakery business by 
employing new methods of organization and value delivery, e.g. switching from metal racks 
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to plastic crates, which increased the amount of products being shipped and the overall 
hygiene level of deliveries.  
“…Since 1998 the distribution happened so that there were metal racks with 
wooden boxes and you pushed this metal racks to the cars and at the shop, they 
picked from these racks from the wood crates. But this system does not serve the 
customer at all. And at the time it was owned by, the whole distribution system 
was organized by Hleb Trans. We had a few discussion with them about the 
service that we expected but they didn’t’ listen to us and then we decided to get 
the distribution of our own. Also at the same time we decided to change these 
metal racks and wooden crates to plastic crates.” 
Currently, Hlebniy Dom owns 80 trucks in St. Petersburg; while in Moscow the total 
breakdown of owned and outsourced trucks is 40 to 50. However it was noted that for 
Fazer/Hlebniy Dom it is of course more efficient to outsource all of the logistics processes in 
order to focus on the core activities. This is why Fazer envisions that with developments on 
the Russian logistics and retail markets, all of the logistics operations will be outsourced 
completely to 3PLs in approximately a period of five years while training their current 
transportations staff. 
“We even have told that we will train our own staff that they can establish their 
own companies, own companies to start this kind of business, because that is 
what we did in Finland. We trained our own drivers to start their own 
businesses. And then of course with retail and producer, management IT system 
they develop quite similar. But it depends of course.” 
The challenge for Hleniy Dom’s distribution, both own and outsourced is the bad traffic 
conditions. Although St. Petersburg’s traffic is not so much of a problem, compared to 
Moscow’s traffic jams, yet it is slowly beginning to show signs of congestion and instability. 
Compared to Finland, Russian markets are still underdeveloped in terms of available services, 
volumes and elaborate techniques, like electronic ordering. However in upcoming years, due 
to increased knowledge transfer from Western companies, Russian enterprises will be able to 
reach a level, close to their Western counterparts. 
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“If you look at the development of retail in Russia - it has been fast. But to get 
the same operation standards what are in Western Europe - it will take time. So, 
I don’t know how many years it will take but I believe not many.” 
Value 
 
Figure 4-3 Added value of Fazer’s operations in Russia 
The initial value provided to Hlebniy Dom from Fazer’s HQ was knowledge transfer and 
innovations within the bakery business. Additionally this knowledge is passed onto the other 
layers of the organization like Svosnii bakery in Moscow. In return the daughter company 
delivers capital in various forms back to the HQ. Also, value is created in distribution since 
part of Hlebniy Dom’s distribution system is outsourced to 3PLs. Because Fazer understands 
that owning distribution is not core activity, but because of the circumstances cannot 
disregard it – it is not counted as a value creation process. 
4.2.3 Paulig 
History 
Gustav Paulig Ltd is part of the Paulig Group, and its premises are in the Vuosaari district of 
Helsinki. The company was founded in 1876 and is still family-owned. Gustav Paulig Ltd 
engages in high quality coffee production as well as sales of coffee and hot chocolate 
products. Paulig has had coffee roasting operations since 1904. The vision of Gustav Paulig 
Ltd is to be a leading coffee roaster on selected markets. 
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Today Finland’s leading coffee company also operates in the Baltic countries, Russia and 
Russia's neighboring countries. Paulig is particularly noted for its high-quality coffee and 
their brands. 
“That the day we compromise on quality we can close our factory gates.” 
The wide coffee range offers flavour sensations for consumers who appreciate light and dark 
roast filter coffees, coffees beans or espressos. Paulig supplies Horeca professionals with a 
number of product and service concepts as well as up-to-the-minute training programs at the 
Paulig Institutes. 
Key Findings 
Paulig was involved in coffee business already during the Soviet Union times. When the 
USSR collapsed, Paulig decided to not only decrease, but rapidly increase its presence on the 
newly established Russian market. This was not a greatly difficult move to undertake, since 
majority of competitors from outside of Russia simply pulled the plug and fled in all aspects 
risky Russian Federation. 
“…We just had to stay there and then we gained big market share. And even 
today we are second biggest in real coffee.” 
Up until recently Paulig had a representative office in Russia that was responsible only for the 
sales of Paulig products. The logistics Paulig utilized included three good-relationship 
partners from Russia that imported goods from Finland and Estonia, as well as distributed 
them among the clients of Paulig. This in part created a “black hole” for the company because 
these distributors were simply buying Paulig products from Finland and/or Estonia and then 
selling to other agents and/or retailers, generating a lack of knowledge on Paulig’s part of the 
operations occurring. 
However now, Paulig opened a logistics center and an office in Moscow that will be 
responsible for marketing and all client contacts in Russia; where Paulig will own the 
products, making it easier to track price mark-ups and fluctuations accordingly. Currently the 
situation with the distributors of Paulig is that they are beginning to play more the role of an 
actual distributor as opposed to an importer that buys the products and owns them until the 
end of the supply chain. By switching to such operations, and putting into work the newly 
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established logistics center Paulig will be able to simpler take clients’ requests into account. 
Overall Paulig’s attitude towards logistics can be summarized in the following: 
“Now in logistics distribution globally there is this outsourcing philosophy, that 
you concentrate your core business that is managing these flows. So it is not 
necessary any more according to latest thinking to own the trucks, own the 
warehouse, not to need invest in that but invest into core business. You can buy 
these services and make the fixed costs variable costs. But what is of course is 
important in this philosophy that your management and your buying skills that 
you get good service for your money. Because when you are buying these 
services there are huge amount of other customers who are also buying these 
services. And those customers who are not putting the attention to the 
partnership they are getting lousier service. So our philosophy is that we put lots 
of energy and work between the relations with our partners, because we are 
getting the biggest attention…Capital costs, methods of dealing with customers, 
but physical processes can and are outsourced.” 
Additionally, Paulig is developing its local presence by building a manufacturing plant as a 
part of its establishment strategy in Russia, which should be ready by 2009. This 
manufacturing plant will be located between St. Petersburg, which is logistically a good 
location, Tver, for following up on the two major markets of Paulig – Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. Also this manufacturing plant in cooperation with the new logistics center in 
Moscow should serve as a hub, as a gateway to other cities in Russia as well. 
“…Nowadays in Russia everybody wants that you are coming in and be closer 
so we want to be with Russians. Then local presence there also. And it will 
come, not from Helsinki, but major of the products will come from Tver to 
Moscow and from Tver to St. Petersburg, because this is only first starting point, 
maybe we will have more presence in regions and St. Petersburg. Ok, depending 
on what our retail customers demand. Because now we have to hear our 
customers wishes and what they expect from us and then we are following and 
trying to find out some economic ideas by working together with some other 
partners, because in Russia you can not survive by having own cars and own 
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warehouses, because there is no economical… you can not make any formula to 
justify. You have to be clever and modestly work with somebody else.” 
Value 
 
Figure 4-4 Added value of Paulig’s operations in Russia 
The figure above is a combination of the value added currently and in the near future, with 
Paulig’s manufacturing plant in use. The initial value now is generated with the coordinated 
work of the sales office, marketing office, logistics center and importers, who by 2009 would 
have to seriously reconsider their offerings and probably switch to providing simple 
transportation services, i.e. serving as distributors, as opposed to importers. However now, 
these 3PLs play a major role because of their high involvement in the operational processes of 
Paulig by providing import, transportation and warehousing services. Also, the Moscow 
office will deliver coordination to other cities in Russia. When the Tver manufacturing plant 
becomes working, another value stream will be created, where Paulig will not have to rely on 
importers and will have direct access to its products and better marketing. 
4.2.4 Atria 
History 
Atria Plc is a forward-looking, strongly internationalizing food-processing company. Atria 
was Finland’s largest meat processor in 2007 in terms of turnover, and one of the industry’s 
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leading companies in the Nordic countries, Russia and the Baltic countries. The Atria Group’s 
turnover in 2007 was approximately EUR 1,270 million.  
The Atria Group employs approximately 5,900 people. The Group is centered in four 
geographical areas: Atria Finland, Atria Scandinavia, Atria Russia and Atria Baltic. Listed on 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange, Atria Plc’s roots go back to the year 1903, a time when its first 
owner cooperative was founded. 
Key findings 
Atria established itself on the Russian market long time ago, in the beginning of the 20th 
century, but established a solid local presence only in 2005, when it bought Pit-Produkt of St. 
Petersburg and made it into a wholly owned subsidiary. Pit-Produkt has a factory near 
Murmansk highway, with another factory being built by Pulkovo airport. By the end of 2008 
Pit-Produkt should finish construction of a large logistical center, which is envisioned to 
centralize all of Pit-Produkt’s logistical operations in Russia. Also, Pit-Produkt has recently 
acquiered Kampomos, a Moscow-based enterprise, which will equal Pit-Produkt to a total 
value of 150 million EUR. 
Atria, compared to previous companies, is strongly in favor of owning all the distribution 
channels, because it sees it as a core activity of the company and a process, which is 
preferable by major clients. 
“We do believe that logistics is one of our core competencies and we count on 
direct distribution for our major clients. For some small clients we do have 
distributors, I mean small clients like kiosks, pavilions and so on. It is not 
profitable to deliver small 1-2-3 kg packages of sausages to them but it is more 
profitable to use distributor…75% – 80% of our deliveries are own directed 
distribution with our own trucks.”  
“…First of all we can be sure that the quality of the delivery chain would be 
good, because we can control that chain; secondly, when we have to have our 
own direct distribution, we have all information, we can go from our logistics 
center to the point of sales. So we can control better the information flow and 
deliveries. And the third one is that we do know and we can control the costs 
concerning deliveries.” 
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From Atria’s perspective increasing raw material prices, gasoline prices and traffic congestion 
in St. Petersburg and Moscow regions are the major issues, otherwise Atria is satisfied with 
Pit-Produkt’s performance and its current state. 
Value 
 
Figure 4-5 Added value of Atria’s operations in Russia 
The most value is generated from having a significant local presence on both the St. 
Petersburg and Moscow markets, where with the help of wholly owned distribution systems 
through logistical center Pit-Produkt is able to directly deliver the products and satisfy its 
customers. 
4.2.5 Others 
The other companies involved in the research, Raisio, Saarioinen, and HK Scan also have 
recent history of presence on the Russian market. This history involves primarily export and 
import operations with some help from a sales representative located in Russia. Up until four 
years ago, the named above firms were all involved in export operations. In 2004 Raisio has 
established a strong local presence by opening up a production facility of one of its products – 
margarine. However in 2007 Raisio chose a subcontractor to run its margarine operations in 
Russia because it was not cost efficient to do it on their own. Raisio also is involved in other 
ventures indirectly, like agricultural firm Zolotoi Kolos. Saarioinen, a company with a wide 
range of products, is primarily exporting into Russia its jams and dressings. They do this 
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through a co-operative company called Fintorus that is concerned with importing food 
products to the Russian market on behalf of many small – medium sized Finnish food 
companies. HK Scan has an established but small import office in St. Petersburg that deals 
solely with a limited number of local wholesalers, who operate most of the logistics on HK 
Scan’s behalf. 
The value added by these companies includes exporting products through distributors as well 
as in Raisio’s case through 3PLs, should Raisio follow up on its goals and attain 100% 
outsourcing logistic possibilities in the several years to come. 
Additionally to the food companies I have spoken with the manager of Fintorus regarding the 
position that local presence in the form of manufacturing plant or plants is promising for 
business, especially when a synergy can be created by combining core operations of a 
company with understandable outsourcing procedures, in this case logistical procedures. 
“Those who have own production or some kind of activity on the Russian side they 
are quite good and their perspectives are quite good. But companies that have only 
export activities from Finland they are surviving. But not doing well.” 
Fintorus is responsible for distributing the products of about 20 small Finnish food companies 
that are incapable of delivering their products to the Russian market themselves, primarily 
because of the cost (Laitimo Tea, interview, 18.09.2008). There are two sides to this 
operation, the first being Fintorus; Fintorus buys products from the small Finnish food 
producers. On the other side there is Finprod, a subsidiary of Fintorus. Its primary function is 
to import and essentially buy all the products from Fintorus, subsequently actually delivering 
all the products from Finland to its key markets of St. Petersburg and Moscow. 
According to Ms. Laitimo, Fintorus and Finprod are pitching their business to small food 
producers so that they are “delivering and distributing the goods as much as we can from the 
same truck, which we are using for importing.” This should definitely cut costs, but however 
is not quite enough; not to mention that it does not always happen in the way everything was 
originally planned. Furthermore it was noted that clear focus of where a company can and 
cannot generate enough revenue. 
“You do as much as you can by yourself and other things you just outsource.” 
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This is important due to the fact that having full control over firms operations through direct 
ownership of its activities is essential for most cases in Russia because of underdevelopment 
of the logistic market and its current players. However, in the words of Ms. Laitimo: “if you 
can find a good and reliable partner, why should you do it by yourself? The key question is to 
find a partner and rely on. It can be another Finnish company, a Russian company, it can be 
something else, but you need a partner you can trust.” 
4.3 Summary 
Overall, there were two clear tendencies drawn from the interviews and subsequent 
discussions. Firstly, establishment of local presence in the form of a production facility is of 
great importance to the Finnish food companies. This is in part explained by the market 
conditions in all of its conditions, e.g. political, economical, social etc. Second, those 
companies that did have manufacturing facilities in Russia (except Atria) were in great favor 
of outsourcing logistics activities into the management of 3PLs. 
According to the interviews Russian logistics market is not yet developed in terms of 
technological advancements, infrastructure, and social applicability aspects. It is essential to 
keep in mind that outsourcing logistics today is primarily about managing relationships, thus 
building up trust and other necessary factors for the foundation of relationships is necessary to 
initially allow for the development to happen. 
The outsourcing relationships are both greatly important when dealing with distributors as 
well as inside 3PLs. Fazer and Raisio both partially own their distribution, but this system is 
expected to change in the next 5-10 years, when Russian logistics’ market has more to offer in 
terms of scope of services, price, quality etc. Atria is the ‘white crow’ in the total sample of 
the interviewed companies, because its directors believe that apart from being a producer 
Atria is also an efficient logistics service provider, which allows it to reap the benefits of this 
deal in the form of quality, information flows and costs, while maintaining local 
manufacturing plants. 
Below are two tables encompassing the overall outcome of the study – local operations by 
company and logistic arrangements by company: 
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  Valio Atria Fazer Raisio Paulig Saarioinen HK Scan 
own production               
subsidiary               
sales office               
export               
 
  Valio Atria Fazer Raisio Paulig Saarioinen HK Scan 
100% distributor               
own distribution               
part own/part dist.               
100% outsourcing               
Out of sample size of seven (n=7) we can see that four Finnish food companies have their 
own production facilities. Out of these four one already has opted, while two others are 
moving towards complete outsourcing of logistic operations because it is not a core 
competence of those firms. Focusing on non-core activities is considered ineffective thus 
causing unefficient management of resources and missed opportunities in areas where it 
would have been possible to work had there not been core activities involved drawing away 
capital and labor tools. Alternatively, one company is engaged in logistical operations on its 
own due to the fact that it views the overall supply chain management as a core process of the 
firm that is able to differentiate it from others while adding value to the customers (large retail 
stores do not want to deal with 3PLs, rather with the actual suppliers, for example) and 
boosting its competitive advantage. 
The three companies that are not manufacturing products in the target country have export 
activities in place, sales office representation or a combination of both approaches. It is 
unanimously agreed that these enterprises engage distributors for the role of logistics service 
providers in order to get their products to the point of sale in Russia. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
From observation and research we can conclude that the type of operation does indeed 
correlate with the logistical arrangements utilized. Through discussions with representatives it 
was obvious that all of them are completely sure of their decisions to outsource, develop 
logistics in-house and so on. There were several correlations regarding the interviews, like 
traffic and distribution concerns, main target markets of Russia for Finnish food companies 
being St. Petersburg and Moscow, as well as clear signs of development fo the the Russian 
supply chain management market with future positive prospects expected in the following 5-
10 years. These aspects were viewed in light of the interesting parts regarding the secondary 
research in the Prior Research section, like the theories of Internationalization of the Firm and 
Porters Competitive Advantage, as well as Supply Chain and Logistics Outsourcing concepts. 
Hence, Prior Research combined with the Interview Research, and integrated into the 
framework presented in the Framework section, the model for Optimal Operations looks like 
the following: 
 
Figure 5-1 Framework model, revised 
Meaning, should a Finnish food company establish a production facility in Russia, it should 
be exploring the possibilities and thinking of attaining the Smart Sourcing / 100% outsourcing 
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policy in the following years, or it should develop clear and trustworthy relationships with 
initial partners to primarily establish outsourced logistics operations. Why establishing own 
production is crucial for many businesses including Finnish food companies in Russia? Even 
though the physical distance is relatively short, the actual business distance might be 
significant should there not be a local presence involved. By utilizing the means of production 
in Russia, Finnish food companies are achieving the opportunity of having a ‘feel’ for the 
market, which feeds more useful information into the data flow of the company thus allowing 
more valuable and value-added judgements and decisions to take place within that particular 
company. Outsourcing is simply a logical additive to this combination, due to the conclusions 
obtained from the Prior Research segments, in particular that a food producing company 
should outsource because it is not its core activitiy and focus primarily on the business agenda 
directly involving company’s resources and/or revenue streams. 
The other forms of local presence as defined in the Prior Research section, are more flexible 
and concerning the their logistical arrangements, however few patterns are evident there as 
well. Should a Finnish food company export through an agent or through its own sales office, 
it is best to utilize 3PLs as distributors, as opposed to directing own supply chain operations 
due to the costs of transportation as well as concept of Porter’s Competitive Strategies. 
The dotted boxes represent the value streams between a particular type of 
operation/operations in a target country and the distribution methods. Thus by dealing with 
the manufacturing/outsourcing model there are efficiency improvements, cost reductions and 
more allocation of resources towards the core activities. In the case of other local presence 
operations there is easy access to the market, with small number of controllable variables 
however; also custom’s clearance up until recently was determined as a problem area, where 
corrupt distributors and/or agents exploit the flaws of the system causing the overall plan to 
turn towards the ‘grey area.’ Now however, more and more partners understand how 
important it is to perform custom’s clearance with full responsibility, integrity and attention 
avoiding illegal and grey area matters aside. 
 
 
 56 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Andersen, O. (1993). On the Internationalization Process of Firms: A Critical Analysis. 
Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 209-231. 
Arnold, J. R., Chapman, S. N., & Clive, L. M. (2007). Introduction to Materials Management. 
Pearson Education, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. 
ATKearney. (2005). The 2005 Global Retail Development Index, Destination: Russia. 
Retrieved August 28, 2008, from ATKearney: 
http://atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/GRDI_2005_Russia.pdf 
Bolumole, Y. A., Frankel, R., & Naslund, D. (2007). Developing a Theoretical Framework 
for Logistics Outsourcing. Transportation Journal, Vol. 46, Issue 2, pp. 35-54. 
Bradley, F. (1990). International marketing strategy, Prentice Hall, New York. 
Cavusgil, T. S. (1984). Differences among exporting firms based on their degree of 
internationalization. Journal of Business Research, Vol. 12, Issue 2, pp. 195-208. 
Collins, J. (2001). Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap...and Others Don't. 
HarpersCollins Publishers Inc., New York. 
Earl, J. S. (1999). Privatization in Russia Offers Lessons for Others. Economic Reform Today, 
No. 2, pp. 38-44. 
Earle, M. J. (1996). The Risks of Outsourcing IT. Sloan Management Review, Vol. 37, Issue 
3, pp. 26-32. 
English Dictionary (2001). For Advanced Learners. HarperCollins Publishers Inc., Glasgow. 
Farmer, D., & von Amstel, R. P. (1991). Effective Pipeline Management, Gower Publishing 
Company Limited, England. 
 57 
FLEXNEWS. (2008, August 6). Russia's Food and Drink Sector to Continue Its “Booming 
Development” – Bonduelle Russia's CEO. Retrieved August 20, 2008, from FLEXNEWS: 
http://www.flex-news-food.com/console/PageViewer.aspx?page=18303 
Gregory, P. R., & Stuart, R. C. (1998). Russian and Soviet Economics Performance and 
Structure, Addison-Wesley Longman Inc., USA. 
Haimi, E. (2007). Pro-Gradu. Timing of foreign production investment. Case: 
Internationalization of large Finnish food industry companies in Russia. 
Halldorsson, A., Kotzab, H., Mikkola, J. H., & Skjot-Larsen, T. (2007). Complementary 
Theories to Supply Chain Management. Supply Chain Mangement: An International Journal, 
Vol. 12, Issue 4, pp. 284-296. 
Hirvikorpi, H. (2006). Venäjä voittoa nurkan takaa. Retrieved August 25, 2008, from 
Ekonomilehti: http://ekonomilehti.com/juttu.asp?i=1281&c=947 
Hutchinson, N. E. (1987). An integrated approach to logistics managements. Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure. The Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-
360.      
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The Internationalization Process of the Firm-A Model of 
Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-32. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1990). The Mechanism of Internationalization. International 
Marketing Review, Vol. 7, Issue 4, pp. 11-24. 
Johanson, J., & Wiedersheim-Paul, F. (1975). The internationalization of the Firm - Four 
Swedish cases. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 12, Issue 3, pp. 305-322. 
Kaipio, H., & Leppänen, S. (2005). Distribution of the Food Sector in Russia - Perspective of 
Finnish Food Industry, Lappeenranta University Northern Dimension Research Center, 
Lappeenranta, 52. 
 58 
 
Knemeyr, M., & Murphy, P. (2005). Exploring the Potential Impact of Relationship 
Characteristics and Customer Attributes on the Outcomes of Third-party Logistics 
Arrangements. Transportation Journal, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 5-19. 
Kotilainen, M. (2004). Finnish-Russian Economic Relations. Finnish Economy and Society, 
Issue 1, pp. 90-96. 
Lambert, D. M., Cooper, M. C., & Pagh, J. D. (1998). Supply Chain Management: 
Implementation Issues and Research Opportunities. International Journal of Logistics 
Management, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 1-20. 
Ledyaeva, S. (2007). Spatial econometric analysis of determinants and strategies of FDI in 
Russian regions in pre- and post-1998 financial crisis periods, Bank of Finland, BOFIT, 
Institute for Economies in Transition, Helsinki. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing 
New Product Development. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, Special Issue: Strategy 
Process: Managing Corporate Self-Renewal, pp. 111-125 
Logan, M. S. (2000). Using agency theory to design successful outsourcing relationships. 
International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 11, Issue 2, pp. 21-32. 
Luostarinen, R. (1982), Foreign Operations of the Firm, Helsinki School of Economics, 
Helsinki. 
Markides, C. C., Williamson, P. J. (1994). Related Diversification, Core Competencies and 
Corporate Performance, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, Special Issue: „Strategy: 
Search for New Paradigms“, pp. 149-165. 
Mathews, J. A., & Zander, I. (2007). The international entrepreneurial dynamics of 
accelerated internationalisation. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 
pp. 387-403. 
Ollus, S.-E., & Simola, H. (2006). Russia in the Finnish Economy, Sitra, Edita Prima Ltd., 
Helsinki. 
 59 
Prahalad, C. K., Hamel, G. (1990). The Core Competence of the Corporation, Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 68, Issue 3, pp. 79-91 
Porter, M. (1980). Competitive Strategy, techniques for analyzing industries and competitors, 
Free Press, New York. 
Saralehto, S. (1989). Internationalization of Finnish Companies. Unitas, Finnish Economic 
Quarterly Review, Vol. 61, Issue 4, pp. 103-108. 
Spear, B. (1997). Logistics: Key to corporate strategy. Transportation & Distribution, Vol. 
38, Issue 5, pp. 69-72. 
Spekman, R. E., Kamauff Jr, J. W., & Myhr, N. (1998). An empirical investigation into 
supply chain management: a perspective on partnerships. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 28, Issue 8, p. 630. 
Supply Chain Council. (2008). What is Supply Chain. Retrieved October 15, 2008, from 
Supply Chain Council: http://www.supply-
chain.org/cs/root/about_us/faq#What%20is%20the%20supply-chain? 
Talouselämä. (2007, May 8). 100 suurinta työllistäjää. Retrieved September 2, 2008, from 
Talouselämä: http://www.talouselama.fi/docview.do?f_id=1167469 
Teece, D. J., Pisano G., Shuen A. (1990). Firm capabilities, resources and the concept of 
strategy, Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation Working Paper # 90-9, University 
of California at Berkeley, Center for Research in Management, Berkeley. - (adapted from 
Leonard-Barton 1992) 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2007). World 
Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and 
Development, United Nations Publications, Switzerland. 
Wickramasekera, R., & Oczkowski, E. (2006). Stage Models Re-visited: A Measure of the 
Internationalization of a Firm. Management International Review, Vol. 46, Issue 1, pp. 39-56. 
Zsidin, G., & Ellram, L. (2003). An Agency Theory Investigation of Supply Risk 
Management. Journal of Supply Chain Management, Vol. 39, Issue 3, pp. 15-27. 
 60 
 
Баранов, А. (2008, July 31). Олимпиада в Пекине - римейк Олимпиады-80. Retrieved 
August 20, 2008, from Forum MSK: http://forum.msk.ru/material/news/506403.html 
Радаев, В. (2007). Захват Российских Территорий, Издательский Дом ГУ ВШЭ, 
Москва. 
Трейним, Н. (2008, February 18). Финские ворота в Россию. Retrieved August 20, 2008, 
from Expert Online: http://www.expert.ru/printissues/countries/2008/01/document374015 
Шпаак, A. (2003). Европейское сообщество в России. Технологии, производство, 
перспективы. Технологии строительства, pp. 4-16. 
Valio. (n.d.). Valio as an international company. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from Valio: 
http://www.valio.fi/portal/page/portal/valiocom/Company_information/History/valio_as_an_i
nternational_company08082006093841 
Atria. (n.d.). Atria Group in Brief. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from Atria: 
http://www.atria.fi/asp/empty.asp?P=1208&VID=default&SID=648773279062954&S=0&C=
19228 
Fazer. (n.d.). About Fazer. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from Fazer: 
http://www.fazer.fi/templates/Fazer_Information.aspx?id=1732&epslanguage=EN 
Paulig. (n.d.). Paulig: The Company. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from Paulig: 
http://www.paulig.fi/the_company 
 61 
INTERVIEWS 
Juha Kaarimaa, Managing Director, Fazer Russia, Helsinki, 12.06.2008. 
Ronny Reijonen, Logistics Manager, Paulig Gustav Oy, Helsinki, 19.06.2008. 
Jacek Dziekonski, Eastern Europe Food Division Manager, Raisio, email, 08.07.2008. 
Mari Jämsén, Key Account Manager, Russia, Saarioinen Oy, email, 12.06.2008. 
Veijo Meriläinen, E.V.P. International Operations and Innovations, Valio Ltd., Helsinki, 
13.06.2008. 
Kai Seikku, CEO (chairman), HK Ruokatalo Oy, Finland, email, 18.06.2008. 
Tea Laitimo, Managing Director, Fintorus, Lappeenranta, 18.09.2008. 
Juha Ruohola, Managing Director, OOO Pit–Produkt (Atria Russia), telephone. 
 62 
 
APPENDICES 
#1. Top 10 countries* by GDP (trillion), World Bank, 2007 
 
*Note: Eurozone (second in World Bank) has been excluded 
#2. List of interviewees 
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#3. Questionnaire 1 – Food Companies 
General 
1. Tell us about your current business in Russia. 
2. Was logistics a major factor in determining to do business in Russia as you do today? 
3. How does your logistic work in the Russian market? Why? How has logistics changed 
over time in Russia? 
4. How successful has this practice been? 
5. Do you think this approach should be changed somehow? 
6. What are your main problems with Russian logistics? 
7. What is the state of Russian logistics and how does that affect the Finnish companies 
doing business in Russia? 
Detailed 
1. Tell us about your current business in Russia. Plants (how many)/growth. 
2. Was logistics a major factor in determining to do business in Russia as you do today? Why? 
3. How has logistics changed over time in Russia and how does your logistic work in the 
Russian market today? 
4. Why do you use this specific logistical structure, i.e. what are the main reasons for this?  
5. How successful has this practice been? Any problems with this structure? Would you like 
to see anything change – distributor/supplier relationships, better infrastructure, value added 
services? 
6. The price of oil/foodstuffs (especially in Russia) is on the rise. Do you feel the effects of 
these market tendencies and how do they affect your business? 
7. What do you see happening right now in the logistics industry in Russia? What are the 
current trends/fads used? At what evolutionary stage is Russian logistics currently? How 
does that affect now and will affect in the future the Finnish companies trying to penetrate 
the Russian market? 
8. How does the Finnish logistics differ from the Russian logistics market? How did you adapt 
to the existing logistics environment? 
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#4. Questionnaire 2 – Fintorus 
1. Tell me what is the business of Finnpro. How much does Finnpro involves itself in logistic 
matters?  
2. How successful do you think Finnish companies in general in Russia? What about in terms 
of their supply chain? Where do you see the biggest challenges and problems?  
3. What do you think would be an efficient supply chain model for Finnish companies in 
Russia? Should there be more outsourcing? Or maybe more of combination of outsourcing 
and own transportation?  
4. How important do you think is local presence for Finnish companies? What are the main  
factors Finnish companies need to be aware of when considering building this local presence?  
5. Do you think that for Finnish companies logistics systems are influenced by the type of 
local presence in Russia? If a company has a production plant in St. Petersburg would it be a 
good idea to deliver its products by a third party service provider, sell it through an agent or 
maybe deliver the products themselves?  
6. What is the state of Russian logistics and how does that affect the Finnish companies doing 
business in Russia? 
 
#5. Break-down of Finnish foodstuff exports by country in euro (collected from Finnish 
Board of Customs) 
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#5. Geographical Breakdown of Foreign Direct Investment in newly issued shares of 
Russian Nonfinancial Sectors, selected countries, mln. USD (Central Bank of Russia) 
 
 
#6. Inward Foreign Direct Investments in Non-banking Corporations, Balance of 
Payments Data, inflows minus outflows, selected countries, mln. USD (Central Bank of 
Russia) 
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#7. Foreign Investments into Russian Economy, by sector, mln. USD (Rosstat) 
 
